Richard C. Boldt /

44

Review Essay / Excuse Theory
Through a Liberal Lens
Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, xx + 295 pp.

RICHARD C. BOLDT
One good way to size up a new book is to imagine the
author’s intended audience and purpose. In his introduction to Excusing Crime,1 Jeremy Horder, Reader in
Criminal Law and Tutor in Law at Worcester College,
Oxford, saves his reader the trouble of such imagining by
telling us that the “arguments offered” in the volume
“are firmly within the tradition of so-called ‘analytic’,
or—more correctly—‘applied ethical’ thinking about law,
and they are in that respect aimed at judges in the higher
courts, and at other law reforming bodies, as well as at
law students.” [5] Horder’s project is to build a complex
taxonomy of criminal law excuse practices and to use
that account of “why things are as they are” to argue, on
the basis of his version of liberal theory, against “the
restricted range” of excuses in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere. [1] As someone who teaches and writes about
criminal law in a United States law school, reading
Excusing Crime was a little like listening in on a fascinating conversation at a nearby table in a crowded
restaurant. The law students Horder has in mind are
undergraduates for whom philosophical analysis of the
sort he undertakes is less foreign than it would be for the
great run of students at American law schools.2 His
interlocutors—those with whom he imagines himself in
conversation—mostly are British academics, including
John Gardner, Timothy Macklem, Alan Norrie, and
Andrew Ashworth. The book does contain references
from time to time to American criminal law theorists,
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including Michael Moore, Joshua Dressler, Heidi Hurd,
and George Fletcher, but the overwhelming center of
gravity is plainly on the other side of the Atlantic. So too,
the great bulk of legal authority under study consists of
U.K. cases and statutes and, occasionally, law reform
commission proposals. There are, at best, passing references to U.S. cases, and only a few targeted discussions
of the Model Penal Code.
Horder’s basic framing of his taxonomic project is
also characteristic of English rather than American thinking. Excuses, he tells us, excuse wrongful conduct “by
shedding favourable moral light on what D did through
a focus on the reasons that D committed that wrongdoing,
where those reasons played a morally ‘active’ role in D’s
conduct (meaning that what D did or what happened to
D can be subject to critical moral evaluation).” [9] This
emphasis on the “morally active” reasons for an actor’s
conduct, which is central to Horder’s notion of excusing,
may incline some readers to think about the normative
judgments inherent in justification defenses, and
Horder’s taxonomy acknowledges that some excuses—
those characterized by strong “actively justificatory”
elements3—may come very close to being justification
claims. [49] In addition, the requirement that excuses
must be grounded in “morally active” reasons serves to
exclude claims of non-responsibility that many U.S.
theorists regard as legitimate excuses, including insanity
and infancy defenses, precisely because these nonresponsibility claims involve reasons for action with
respect to which the actor is “morally passive.” [9] To be
sure, Horder’s complex analytic system includes some
qualifying excuses—those which are “capacity based”—
that come very close to being claims of non-responsibility,
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but his insistence on including a normative element
ultimately distinguishes these excuses from pure claims
of non-responsibility.4
Criminal law scholars in the United States generally
do not line up the pieces in this fashion. On the one
hand, they often think about justification defenses and
excuses as more discontinuous than Horder does. On the
other hand, though there is no absolute uniformity on
this point, most American criminal law theorists regard
non-responsibility claims such as insanity and infancy
to be complete excuses. As to the first point, U.S. scholarship on the distinction between justification and excuse
has become something of a cottage industry.5 Although
there are lots of variations on the theme, these writers
generally take the position that justified actions are not
wrongful, whereas excused conduct is wrongful behavior
that is exempt from punishment either because the actor’s
characteristics or the circumstances in which he or she
acted render that conduct not culpable.6 With respect to
capacity-based non-responsibility claims, American
writers generally do not insist that an actor’s conduct be
grounded in morally active reasons in order to qualify
for an excuse. Sanford Kadish’s widely cited article on
criminal law excuses, for example, explains that “the
disabilities of choice that ground excuse in our law seem
to fall into one of three groups”: those disabilities that
produce “involuntary actions”; those that produce
“deficient but reasonable actions”; and those that render
all actions non-responsible. The excuses in Kadish’s third
category are defined in terms of the actor’s “inadequate
capacities for making judgments and exercising choice,”
and include infancy and legal insanity.7

Horder has defined a field of study that is
both broader and narrower than many of
his readers are likely to expect.

By virtue of his appreciation that some, but not all,
excuses contain justificatory elements, and given his insistence that pure claims of non-responsibility are not
excuses, Horder has defined a field of study that is both
broader and narrower than many of his readers are likely
to expect.8 This reconfiguration permits Horder to explore
the “theoretical underpinnings” [1] of existing excuses
along three intersecting “dimensions,” and this expli-
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cation and elaboration of his taxonomy takes up most of
the first half of the volume. The effort provides the reader
with new analytic tools to organize and understand the
seemingly unruly universe of excusing practices in
English and American criminal law, and it is the principal
contribution of the book.
The first dimension describes the differences between
“explanatory” and “adopted” reasons for an actor’s
conduct. This dimension is concerned with “the nature of
the morally salient moving force or motivating element
behind D’s conduct.” [45] Adopted reasons are reasons
upon which an actor “positively chooses” to act. Explanatory reasons, by contrast, are reasons for a person’s conduct that he or she does not consciously adopt as the grounds
for his or her action, but which nevertheless can be said to
remain subject to moral evaluation. [10] One possible
example of an excuse based upon an adopted reason is
what Horder calls “excessive defence” and what some U.S.
courts term imperfect self-defense.9 In these cases, the
defendant claims an excuse or partial excuse,
notwithstanding that he or she has used more force than
was reasonably necessary to fend off an unlawful attack,
on the grounds that “the sheer strength of D’s fear made the
choice of a heavy-handed course of action as a means of
thwarting an attack seem entirely rational and proper.” [13]
A second example of an excuse centered on an adopted
reason is a mistake-of-fact claim based upon a defendant’s
conscious choice to engage in wrongful conduct because of
a mistaken belief that circumstances were such that that
conduct was permissible. By contrast, an excuse growing
out of a predominantly explanatory reason for a defendant’s
conduct “comes close to a plea that the conduct is
involuntary.” [47] If the conduct is a product of the effort or
determination of the actor,10 however, even “when D
‘instinctively’ raises an arm to shield him- or herself when
V suddenly advances with a raised fist, or spontaneously
‘explodes with rage’ and lashes out when V provokes him
or her,” the conduct is still subject to moral evaluation and
is still potentially eligible for an excuse (rather than a claim
of non-responsibility).11 [47] The distinction between
adopted and explanatory reasons is important in Horder’s
account in a number of respects, but perhaps nowhere more
so than with regard to provocation. Thus, when a homicide
defendant “decides to make his or her anger grounds for
retaliation”—that is, when retaliation stemming from
extreme anger is the defendant’s adopted reason for action—
Horder believes that the claim for a partial excuse of
provocation is weaker than when “a loss of self-control is
merely the explanatory reason for the retaliatory conduct.”
[12]
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The second dimension described by Horder concerns
the nature of the actor’s perspective at the time of wrongdoing. In Horder’s terms, a claim to excuse is “actively
justificatory” if the actor’s decision to act was based
upon a contemporaneous belief that he or she was
factually or morally justified. Of course, this claim is not
that the defendant really was justified in doing what he
or she did, but only that he or she believed that the
conduct was the right thing to do. By contrast, other
claims to excuse, which Horder calls “capacity based,”
while acknowledging that the defendant was aware at
the time of acting that he or she was not justified, provide
a partial or complete defense on the grounds that the
defendant’s capacity to avoid wrongdoing was limited
in a way that sheds favorable moral light on his or her
conduct. With respect to actively justificatory excuses, in
which the defendant believed that his or her conduct
was either factually or morally justified, a missing element
defense may be available if the defendant’s honest belief
“negatives” a required mental element in the charged
offense.12 Horder points out, however, that some criminal
statutes require a mistake of fact to be both honest and
reasonable in order to serve as the basis of a complete
defense. In these cases, he suggests, the objective reasonableness requirement “shows that it [the mistake claim]
is really doing excusatory work respecting wrong.”13 [49]
Other excuses are based upon the assertion that “no
more could reasonably have been expected of D, in terms
of courage, powers of self-control, or of foresight,”
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was aware
at the time of acting that the conduct was wrongful. [5051] These capacity-based excuses include some types of
provocation, duress, and diminished capacity. It may
also be possible to combine actively justificatory and
capacity-based elements in a single excuse claim. Thus,
although much duress doctrine is limited to capacitybased conceptions about what could reasonably be
expected of an ordinary courageous person under the
circumstances, it would not be incoherent, Horder
suggests, to require a showing that, at the time of acting,
the defendant also mistakenly believed that his or her
conduct was justified.
The third and final dimension described in Horder’s
taxonomy of excuses concerns the grounds on which a
defendant’s conduct may be “viewed in a favourable
moral light.” This dimension operates by way of a distinction between “predominantly ascriptive” grounds
for such an evaluation versus a “predominantly normative basis for so doing.” [52-53] Horder constructs this
distinction around the work of Joseph Raz, who has
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suggested that “[n]ormative theory is primarily concerned
with establishing what people ought to do” whereas
“[t]he theory of ascription is concerned with the
conditions in which blame or guilt can be ascribed to
people.”14 [53] Horder demonstrates the distinction
between predominantly ascriptive and normative
grounds for excuse in the context of duress cases. He
begins by observing that all duress defenses have “at
least one ascriptive aspect to them,” which is the capacity
of significant fear to “alter the balance of reasons in D’s
mind, so that he or she understandably gives priority to
saving him- or herself, if need be by committing the wrong
in question.” In predominantly ascriptive forms of duress,
there may be very little else to say about the defendant’s
conduct, except that we do not blame him or her “at all,
or at least not all that much, for giving in to certain kinds
of threats by doing certain kinds of wrongs.”15 [58] In
other circumstances, however, we can understand duress
as predominantly normative in nature. Suppose, for
example, that a defendant faces a choice between
submitting to a credible threat of death on the one hand,
or giving in to a demand to invade a minor property
interest held by an innocent third party on the other.
Horder points out that a decision to invade the minor
property interest in this case can be treated as a justified
instance of necessity. If, however, the choice is between a
threat of death on the one hand and a non-deadly assault
on an innocent third person on the other, the choice-ofevils defense may slide into an excuse claim for duress,
depending upon the relative harm directed against the
innocent. In such cases, Horder suggests, when it can be
said that a defendant’s reaction to the pressing danger
“did not go far beyond what was truly justified,” the
duress defense will be predominantly normative in nature. [59] As he puts it: “Even when D inflicts an unjustified harm on an innocent V, crucial to D’s excuse can be
the claim that there was at least a kind of normative or
justificatory ‘logic’ to D’s decision to inflict that (ex
hypothesi, minor) harm, particularly if D did so to avoid
certain death him- or herself.” [62]
After setting out in detail the three dimensions
comprising his taxonomy, Horder begins to map various
excuses according to the coordinates he has identified.
This portion of the book is a challenging read, as the
following passage demonstrates:
Individual excuses can be differentiated from one another
in each dimension, as can different manifestations of the
same excuse; and there is a surprising amount of variation.
Let me give some examples. Excessive defence and most
duress cases involve adopted, actively justificatory reasons
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for action (dimensions 1 and 2), and have a predominantly
normative basis (dimension 3). If an excuse claim is
predominantly ascriptive in character (dimension 3), it may
also be capacity-based, as in the cases of provocation,
clumsiness, due diligence or diminished capacity, but that is
not always so. [63]

Notwithstanding some unwieldiness, the complex,
multi-variable nature of this approach is clearly superior
at a descriptive level to the alternatives pursued by a
number of other theorists. For example, some writers take
the position that provocation is primarily justificatory in
nature, whereas others argue that it is a partial excuse
centered largely on the incapacity of the defendant to
control his or her behavior.16 Horder’s approach, by
contrast, permits us to explore the variety of ways in
which strong emotions interact with defendants’ cognitive deliberative processes to produce wrongful behavior.
He points out, for example, that some defendants who
experience great anger “still find it possible consciously
to act for, or in spite of, certain reasons: the case I have
been referring to as one in which people act for adopted
reasons.” [71] In other instances, the defendant’s
“absence of full deliberative, rational control” over his or
her desire to retaliate “explains why the desire . . . is the
main ascriptive (excusatory) focus.” Horder’s multidimensional approach demonstrates “that emotions may
find intentional expression in action in different ways,
through a distinction between cases in which D acts for
explanatory reasons (when the action is closer to the
involuntary end of the spectrum), and cases in which D
acts for adopted reasons (when the action is closer to a
case in which D retains full rational control over his or
her conduct).” [72]

Notwithstanding some unwieldiness, the
complex, multi-variable nature of his
approach is clearly superior at a descriptive
level to the alternatives pursued by a
number of other theorists.
When Horder turns his attention to making sense of
the moral claims embedded in his taxonomy, the payoff
for all of his (and his readers’) hard work is apparent. As
noted earlier, the central moral claim is that excuses
excuse wrongful conduct when they shed favorable moral
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light on that conduct, given the “morally active” reasons
for the defendant’s behavior. It is relatively easy to understand how a defendant who has acted for adopted
reasons that were actively justificatory can make a strong
claim in this regard, but things get more difficult when
the defendant has acted for explanatory reasons and/or
claims an excuse based upon his or her limited capacity
to control wrongful conduct. If a defendant has
“explode[d] with rage” or has acted “instinctively” in
response to a victim’s provocative conduct, [47] in what
respect can we say that he or she was “morally active”
with respect to the reasons for his or her conduct? It is
one thing, suggests Horder, to withdraw your hand
reflexively from a hot stove. That sort of reaction involves
involuntary conduct about which moral evaluation is
inapt. It is quite another matter to undertake wrongful
conduct because someone has tortured you into compliance by holding your hand to the hot stove. That
behavior may be “non-voluntary,” says Horder, but it is
properly subject to moral evaluation because you have
retained full control over the execution of the conduct
even as your “deliberative control over whether to engage
in that conduct or not, and on what terms, is severely
undermined or non-existent.”17 [85]
Just as conduct can be located along a continuum
from involuntary to non-voluntary to voluntary-butcoerced to fully voluntary, beliefs and emotions can also
be understood in Horder’s terms as falling out along a
spectrum from involuntariness to full deliberative control.
In this respect, Horder rejects the Humean notion that
beliefs and emotions are, by definition, always
involuntary or passive. Instead, he embraces “empirical
research, and a philosophical tradition, that rejects
Humean assumptions about human nature, and regards
a wide range of (if not all) beliefs and feelings as having
a morally ‘active’ dimension to them.” [79] To be sure,
beliefs and emotions can be involuntary in the same way
that a reflective action is, but only “when they take a very
primitive form, when their genesis does not lie in
situations with complex social and moral meaning.” [79]
Far more often, Horder argues, a person’s beliefs and
feelings are likely to be the product of some degree of
“deliberative control” and are likely to be mediated by
culture and social context. Thus, even though a defendant
has acted on the basis of powerful, and, perhaps, sudden,
emotions, we can still undertake a moral evaluation of
both the conduct and the emotions that produced it.18
Throughout the book, Horder posits a range of possible
scenarios about the interaction of affective and cognitive
processes, and then offers a series of “applied ethical”
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prescriptions for these various possibilities. For example,
Horder suggests that a defendant who has acted on the
basis of adopted reasons, but without an actively
justificatory perspective, may still have a claim to an
excuse on the grounds that intense emotions significantly
influenced his or her cognitive deliberations. In these
cases, he argues, the actor’s moral claim to an excuse
should turn on “what is at stake.” Thus, although
existing provocation doctrine in the United Kingdom
and the United States generally assumes that a defendant
who acts for adopted reasons is not eligible for a
provocation defense, because the cognitive deliberation
involved in adopting reasons for action are inconsistent
with a loss of self-control, Horder would permit such
claims on a sort of sliding scale. As he explains it:
In a provocation case where D’s anger has taken a form
coming closer to the full ‘deliberative control’ end of the
spectrum, we could expressly require more, by way of
provocation, than when D’s anger spontaneously explodes
from within without any element of calculation (the case
where D’s anger is an explanatory reason for his or her
conduct). The fact that D acts for adopted reasons, in cases
where D is outraged following provocation, means that it
would be quite appropriate for the law to insist that D be
responding only to the gravest of provocations in such
cases (the retaliatory stakes must be very high), or even to
deny D an excuse altogether; whereas, the law might be
understandably less insistent on this point in cases where D
reacts immediately and spontaneously to an explosion of
passion. [91]

The central moral claim is that excuses
excuse wrongful conduct when they shed
favorable moral light on that conduct,
given the “morally active” reasons
for the defendant’s behavior.

The philosophical tradition upon which Horder draws
in taking the position that beliefs and feelings, as well as
conduct, ought to be the basis for moral evaluation,
includes Aristotle, Harry Frankfurt, and Joseph Raz. In
this respect, he is in very good company. On the other
hand, the empirical foundation upon which his arguments rest is far less clearly realized. What does it mean
to say that anger has “spontaneously explode[d] from
within without any element of calculation,”19 [91] and
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how is it that other intense emotions influence rational
thinking without causing the actor to bypass cognitive
control? At several critical points in the book, Horder
cites scientific work on the brain and human emotions.
The reader is directed, for example, to a book by Joseph
LeDoux entitled The Emotional Brain: the Mysterious
Underpinnings of Emotional Life, and to an article by Dolf
Zillmann on the role of the limbic system in the evolution
of human emotions.20 Notwithstanding these passing
references, though, Horder does not offer the reader much
in the way of a scientific foundation for his otherwise
quite nuanced account of the complicated ways in which
emotion and cognition interact in and through the human
brain. This is too bad, because there is a growing body of
literature in the area of brain science, the emotions, and
cognition that is relevant to Horder’s project.21
In contrast to the very sketchy empirical foundation
provided in the book, Horder’s argument for the development (or expansion) of three new excuses is carefully
grounded in a well worked-out account of liberal political
theory. He frames this part of his enterprise by first
distinguishing between what he calls the “necessary” as
opposed to “sufficient” conditions for a successful excuse
claim. Not surprisingly, given Horder’s central moral
claim, the necessary condition is the presence of an
explanation for wrongdoing “that sheds such a
favourable moral light on D’s conduct that it seems
entirely wrong to convict, at least for the full offence.” [9]
In effect, the necessary condition focuses on the moral
claims of an individual to be free from punishment (or to
receive mitigated punishment), given the morally active
reasons for his or her conduct. The sufficient conditions,
by contrast, grow out of Horder’s assessment of the community’s collective interests in the fair and effective operation of the criminal law. These conditions operate to limit
individual claims to excuse that satisfy the necessary
condition but that are inconsistent with broader common
goods.22 Among Horder’s sufficient conditions are
strategic and common goods concerns that relate to the
fit between legal prohibitions and secular morality, the
legitimacy of the criminal law and the community’s
interest in “a culture of compliance and law-abidingness,” fairness, system administrability, and the proper
allocation of decision-making authority among governmental actors given the relative institutional competencies of the legislature and the courts.
Horder argues that H.L.A. Hart’s account of excuse
theory is over-broad in that it concentrates on the necessary condition for excuses to the virtual exclusion of any
consideration of sufficient conditions. He is wise to sug-
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gest that the failure of Hart and others to limit excuses by
reference to a set of strategic or common goods criteria
has placed considerable pressure on policy makers and
scholars to adopt a relatively pinched view of the range
of reasons that might otherwise count as meeting the
necessary condition for an excuse. In this light, Horder
argues that the predominant conception of excuses
within the common law, which he calls the classical
theory of excuses, is over-narrow. To take Hart’s formulation, excuses under the classical conception are focused
on “rational defects in any morally salient ‘moving force’
behind the act or omission.” [43] Horder criticizes this
conception in part on the grounds that wrongdoing ought
to be excusable in certain circumstances even when no
such rational defect is present. That is, an excuse should
still be possible even when the grounds for the
defendant’s claim are predominantly normative rather
than ascriptive in nature. In addition, he argues against
the tendency of adherents of the classical theory to distinguish sharply between defendants who have rational
defects and those who have claims of non-responsibility.
The former criticism of the classical view leads Horder to
propose new excuses for “due diligence” and for
“demands-of-conscience.” The latter critique is the basis
for his proposal for a partial excuse for “short-comers,”
that he terms “diminished capacity.”

Horder argues that the predominant
conception of excuses within the common
law is over-narrow.

The point of departure for Horder’s discussion of all
three of these new excuses is Ronald Dworkin’s famous
injunction that the state has an obligation to treat people
with equal concern and respect, “where to treat people
with concern is to treat them ‘as human beings who are
capable of suffering and frustration’, and to treat them
with respect is to treat them ‘as human beings who are
capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions
of how their lives should be lived.’”23 [141] The liberal
commitment to treating people with concern, Horder
suggests, may require that some defendants, who by
virtue of “shortcomings” not rising to the level of insanity
are not fully able to regulate their conduct, be accorded a
partial excuse in some circumstances. By contrast, the
classical view that individuals are either fully responsible
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moral agents or entirely non-responsible for their conduct,
is incapable of taking into consideration, except at sentencing, the sorts of individualized deficits that Horder has
in mind. Thus, subject to the strategic and common goods
limitations imposed by his sufficient conditions, Horder’s
proposal contemplates providing a “diminished capacity” plea24 to some defendants who suffer from deficiencies that do not wholly undermine responsibility, when
these defendants find themselves in circumstances that
contain an incipient or incomplete excusatory factor.
Horder provides a series of very interesting examples
of how this mixing of oil (excuse) and water (mental
deficiency) would function. He begins with cases of family
violence, in which a defendant who has endured abuse
at the hands of a partner or parent finally employs deadly
force to escape the escalating battering or psychological
abuse. While a self-defense defense is often available,
Horder focuses on cases in which a true justification
defense may be inappropriate. In R v. Ahluwalia,25 for
example, the defendant, who suffered from “endogenous
depression,” killed her abusive husband by setting fire
to him as he slept. No self-defense plea was raised,
presumably because there was “considerable evidence
of advance preparation for an attack of a specific kind
(burning), and because D admitted in a letter to her mother
that the reason she had set fire to V was to give him ‘a fire
bath to wash away his sins.’” Nevertheless, Horder
suggests that “the combination of evidence of mental
disorder and evidence of extraordinary external pressure
is sufficient to justify a judgment that a first-degree
conviction would be wrong, and a partial excuse by way
of diminished capacity would be more appropriate.” [181]
Horder also discusses self-defense cases in which
evidence of mental deficiency could be made relevant to
a partial excuse, notwithstanding the defendant’s use of
excessive force. Thus, in R v. Martin (Anthony),26 the
defendant who employed excessive or unreasonable selfdefensive force was suffering from clinical depression
that aggravated a paranoid personality disorder. Apparently, there was expert testimony that the defendant’s
personality disorder could have led him “to perceive the
threat to his safety to be much greater than an ordinary
person would have thought that it was.” [182] Under
existing law in the U.K. and most U.S. jurisdictions, the
depression and personality disorder probably would not
be sufficient to support an insanity defense, and the
defendant’s idiosyncratic characteristics would not be
taken into account in determining the reasonableness of
his perception of necessity. Under Horder’s short-comers
approach, by contrast, the evidence would be admissible
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for purposes of evaluating a partial excuse of diminished
capacity.
Finally, Horder discusses the use of his proposed
diminished capacity defense in some cases involving
defendants with deprived backgrounds. He points out
that
[b]oth biological and environmental factors may combine
to create . . . pressures, in different ways, perhaps
particularly in young people when the influence of
attention deficit disorder, hyperactivity, and low IQ are met
with long-term parental indifference or hostility; and the
influence of the environmental factors in the mix has been
shown to be aggravated by the effects of social and
economic deprivation. [187]

Horder makes out a case for the recognition
of a due diligence excuse in the area of
regulatory offenses, when the defendant
has “done everything humanly possible to
avoid wrong-doing.”

Horder suggests that these sorts of deficits occasioned by
social and economic deprivation, when combined with
some external elements such as threats or provocation,
may support a partial excuse claim under some circumstances. Although it is common for courts and commentators to suggest that the effects of deprivation are best
taken into consideration in sentencing, Horder argues
that a defendant whose capacity to navigate trying
circumstances was substantially diminished at the time
of an offense, is treated with equal concern only when
that fact is made relevant to an assessment of the level of
his or her criminal guilt. In this respect, Horder’s use of
liberal theory as the foundation for his approach to shortcomers is quite interesting. A number of commentators
over the past decades have decried “the modern tendency
to view the self as a machinery to be maintained and
repaired by specialists and to rethink what was once
known as ‘evil’ in terms of pathology rather than moral
choice’.”27 Horder’s approach appears to avoid these
kinds of dehumanizing tendencies inherent in the
rehabilitative ideal while still taking seriously Dworkin’s
injunction to treat short-comers “as human beings who
are capable of suffering and frustration.” It does so by
refusing to exempt these actors from moral judgment
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while simultaneously acknowledging that “they may be,
in some circumstances, just as deserving as the mentally
well-equipped with their own partial excuse claims, of
some punishment, but also of mitigation and leniency,
pure and simple, irrespective of considerations of ‘maintenance and repair’.” [143]
When Horder turns his attention in the final two
chapters of the book to the excuses of due diligence and
demands-of-conscience, he shifts from Dworkin’s notion
that the state has an obligation to treat people with
concern and concentrates instead on the state’s obligation
to treat people with respect. Importantly, respect in these
terms requires the state to recognize that defendants are
“human beings who are capable of forming and acting
on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived.” [141] Horder’s project in this respect is to create
enough “excusatory space” to support the liberal values
of personal autonomy and tolerance of moral pluralism
while still safeguarding societal strategic interests and
common goods through a consideration of sufficient
conditions. The demands-of-conscience cases involve
circumstances in which the defendant is forced to choose
between law abidingness and adherence to important
moral or religious beliefs that conflict with a law of general
application. Horder suggests that when such conflicts
arise, the defendant should be permitted an excuse if his
or her decision to engage in wrongful conduct,28 judged
from the point of view of the law of general application,
was a “relatively trivial legal demand” compared to the
strength or importance of the contrary personal belief. To
hold otherwise, he argues, would be “to place disproportionate emphasis on the importance of law-abidingness” as against the competing liberal values of personal
autonomy and moral pluralism. [199] Horder’s
development of this approach is quite nuanced. He
acknowledges, for example, that there is an important
difference between those who engage in lawbreaking as
a “calculated act of defiance” and those who do so “more
or less spontaneously” out of a “sense of moral
obligation.” [200-201] He also works out in some detail
where his proposal stands relative to the broader tradition
of civil disobedience. This is good work precisely because
it goes beyond a flat account of individual rights and
explores instead both the individual and collective
interests that are at stake in the cases he has in mind.
In the book’s concluding chapter, Horder makes out
his case for the recognition of a due diligence excuse in
the area of regulatory offenses, when the defendant has
“done everything humanly possible to avoid wrongdoing.” [4] Horder’s starting point here is the observation

Winter/Spring 2006

Excuse Theory Through a Liberal Lens

that judges and commentators have unduly narrowed
the range of possible excuses by failing to consider fully
moral claims to exculpation in the context of the
“bureaucratic-administrative state.” [237] He credits the
Canadian Supreme Court in R v. City of Sault Ste Marie29
with showing the way toward such an excuse by
permitting a defense in a strict liability case “if D could
show on the balance of probabilities that he took all
reasonable care,” [239] and he broadens the analysis by
including the possibility as well that reasonable
ignorance of the law might also be the basis for an excuse.
While the insights Horder offers in this chapter are not
as novel as those provided in the context of his discussion
of the short-comers and demands-of-conscience excuses,
his analysis is still compelling and useful. He argues, in
effect, that the common good of reciprocity requires that
the legal system make both substantive and procedural
opportunities available to defendants to answer for their
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wrongs. “If, whatever efforts one may have made or
precautions one may have taken, there is simply no answer
one can make to a criminal charge, the substantive fairness
of one’s trial is threatened, in that one has no self-sufficient
moral reasons, qua individual D, to engage constructively
and co-operatively in the trial process.” [255]
In his consideration of all three of these excuses—
short-comers, demands-of-conscience, and due diligence
—Horder achieves his broader purpose of showing how
a detailed and complex understanding of existing excuse
practices supports the extension of available excusatory
space, subject to the important limits imposed by his
sufficient conditions. This careful use of description and
analysis to construct an “anatomy” of existing excuses
in order to support claims for new excuses is the best
kind of criminal law scholarship. The book is certainly
not an easy read, but it is well worth the trouble.
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